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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
The Case for State Borrowing as a 
Response to the Current Crises
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic is a national 
emergency that requires a national response. 
Asking states to absorb the budgetary losses 
caused by the pandemic while they are tasked 
with providing essential frontline services is 
comparable to asking states during World War II 
to pay for the landing in Normandy.
This article is a contribution to Project SAFE: 
State Action in Fiscal Emergencies.1 We have 
already argued, more than once2, that the federal 
government should borrow to prevent steep state 
and local budget cuts. But because the federal 
government will apparently not take sufficient 
action,3 we offer these ideas to states for how to 
proceed with borrowing absent sufficient federal 
aid.
Additional Clarification
We are only encouraging states to borrow 
against the backdrop of federal failure. Some have 
argued that having states borrow to cover revenue 
shortfalls caused by the pandemic would be a 
better option than direct federal grants,4 but we are 
emphatically not making that argument here. At 
least sometimes, the contention that state 
borrowing would be better is based on a notion of 
limited federal borrowing capacity. Yet we think 
this notion is both false and often hypocritical. It is 
false because the federal government does have 
substantial borrowing capacity,5 certainly more 
than states do, and it is also hypocritical for 
anyone who supported the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
to make this claim. This is because the TCJA 
incurred over $1.5 trillion in federal debt during 
an economic expansion in order to mostly benefit 
the already well-off. One obvious problem with 
pursuing this kind of reckless policy is precisely 
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1
University of Virginia School of Law, “Project SAFE.”
2
Darien Shanske, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, and David Gamage, 
“Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,” Tax Notes 
State, June 8, 2020, p. 1211; Shanske and Gamage, “How the Federal 
Reserve Should Help States and Localities Right Now,” Tax Notes State, 
May 11, 2020, p. 765.
3
Marianne Levine and John Bresnahan, “Standoff Over Covid Relief 
Could Drag Into September,” Politico, Aug. 12, 2020.
4
Yuval Levin, “How Congress Can Help the States,” American 
Enterprise Institute (May 6, 2020).
5
Jim Tankersley, “How Washington Learned to Embrace the Budget 
Deficit,” The New York Times, May 16, 2020.
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that there might not be enough borrowing 
capacity in an emergency.6
Sometimes this borrowing-is-better argument 
is instead couched in terms of fairness between 
states.7 This claim is also off base. For one, it seems 
to assume that only profligate high-tax states are 
suffering.8 This is not true; almost all states will 
suffer collapsing revenue, and many of the so-
called high-tax states did not enter the 
coronavirus crisis in poor fiscal shape.9 Further, 
there is no reason that federal aid cannot be 
limited to help with the current crisis (that is, no 
help with accrued pension debt), perhaps even 
with some kind of per capita limit so as not to 
reward supposedly overly generous states. A per 
capita grant that makes Texas or Florida whole 
would be a huge relief for California, too.
Raising Revenue Is Possible and Preferable
Federal failure has prompted us to encourage 
states to raise revenue so as not to just make deep 
cuts to services.10 However, we are not against 
states also pursuing smaller cost-cutting 
measures like hiring freezes.
Many revenue-raising tools are available, and 
we previously urged state legislatures to consider 
a number of promising reforms to cope with the 
current crisis. Indeed, because state and local 
revenue systems were in such need of reform even 
before the beginning of this crisis, there are lots of 
sensible reforms to raise significant revenue fairly 
and efficiently.11
Because states face balanced budget 
constraints, the fact that we are in a recession is 
not an argument against raising taxes.12 States and 
localities should prioritize raising tax revenues 
from those who can best pay over slashing 
services needed by those who cannot afford to 
lose them (or their jobs), especially because many 
of those services play important roles in 
preventing further harm to state economies.13
The Case for State Borrowing
Another objection to the strategy of raising 
revenue is that it might not be enough. The cost of 
the pandemic is so large that even a state that 
takes us up on our complete menu of revenue-
raising tools might still come up short. Current 
estimates of the need range from $500 billion to $1 
trillion.14 Revenue tools might not be enough,15 but 
that does not mean states should not try to 
prevent unnecessary cuts to the extent that they 
can.
The deeper counter to this objection to 
revenue raising is that states can and should 
borrow, with the borrowing secured by the new 
revenue streams. It seems quite reasonable to 
surmise that in three years state finances will be 
looking a lot better, even without new taxes. 
Indeed, state revenues will likely look better still 
in three years if they do not eat their seed corn 
now by, for example, reducing funding for vital 
services. Consider that if states worked on five-
year budget cycles, a budget planner would be 
well advised to borrow from later in that cycle to 
pay for necessary expenses now, at the nadir.
Thus, the basic idea is that states should 
smooth their taxing and spending by borrowing 
from a better future to sustain the challenging 
present. To ensure that there will be more revenue 
6
William Gale and Yair Listokin, “The Tax Cuts Will Make Fighting 
Future Recessions Complicated,” The Hill, Feb. 23, 2019.
7
See Levin, supra note 4.
8
Richard C. Auxier, “McConnell’s Attempt to Blame States for 
COVID-19 Budget Shortfalls Is Wrong and Dangerous,” Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center (Apr. 24, 2020).
9
See id.; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “States Grappling 
With Hit to Tax Collections” (updated Aug. 24, 2020); National 
Conference of State Legislatures, “Coronavirus (COVID-19): Revised 
State Revenue Projections” (updated Aug. 14, 2020).
10
See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,” 
supra note 2; see also Gamage and Shanske, “States Should Consider 
Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” Tax Notes State, May 18, 2020, p. 859; Adam 
Thimmesch, Shanske, and Gamage, “Strategic Nonconformity to the 
TCJA, Part I: Personal Income Taxes,” Tax Notes State, July 6, 2020, p. 17; 
Shanske, Thimmesch, and Gamage, “Strategic Nonconformity, State 
Corporate Income Taxes, and the TCJA: Part II,” Tax Notes State, July 13, 
2020, p. 123.
11
See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,” 
supra note 2.
12
See Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal 
Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010); Carolina Vargas, 
“Massachusetts Economists Push for Higher Taxes Amid Pandemic,” Tax 




National Governors Association, “National Governors Association 
Outlines Need for ‘Additional and Immediate’ Fiscal Assistance to 
States” (Apr. 11, 2020).
15
But not necessarily. For example, a state that paired a 20 percent 
surcharge on the repatriation with a tax on unrealized capital gains (such 
as a deemed realization proposal like we have proposed, “States Should 
Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” supra note 10) could raise 
considerable revenues in the short term, potentially well in excess of 
what might be needed.
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in the future, states should improve their revenue 
systems now — and there is a lot to improve. 
Because there is so much to upgrade, putting into 
place a suite of revenue enhancements now might 
substantially help states and localities through the 
ongoing emergency.
This is a different proposal than simply 
borrowing without reform, because borrowing 
without putting into place new revenue can be 
hamstrung by one of two problems. First, the 
borrowing could be too small. In that case, there is 
little harm done to the state’s future revenue, but 
it has done little to address the enormous current 
crisis. On the other hand, a state could look to 
borrow on a scale sufficient to the crisis, but 
borrowing like that could place a large burden on 
the state down the road without new revenues.16
To be specific about securitizing revenue, 
suppose California put into place our proposal to 
broaden its corporate income tax base by shifting 
to mandatory worldwide combination.17 In better 
times, this was estimated to raise $2 billion per 
year, a roughly 20 percent increase in state 
corporate income tax revenues. Suppose 
California securitized 10 percent of its corporate 
income tax base — an estimated $1 billion per year 
— for 20 years at a 5 percent rate. That would be 
worth about $12 billion to California right now, 
which is about 85 percent of the $14 billion that 
the state is hoping the federal government will 
provide to head off deep cuts.18 The cost of federal 
funds is closer to 1 percent for a borrowing for 20 
years — so if the Fed were to purchase these 
bonds, as we have argued it should,19 then 
California could raise $17 billion through this 
expedient.
Note that before the onset of the coronavirus, 
California was running a surplus without this 
reform. So even if it were to raise 50 percent less 
than expected, the state’s net fiscal position when 
the recession ends would still be the same as it 
had been expected to be before the crisis and this 
borrowing.
But we do not mean to be overly prescriptive 
about the need for pairing new revenue with 
borrowing. First, the possible crisis that states are 
heading into is so severe that it would be worth it 
to cannibalize the future at least a little bit. Put 
another way, the future crisis in revenue might be 
even worse if states allow their economies to 
contract too much now. Second, states like 
California that had been running a surplus really 
can roughly borrow from future surpluses. Third, 
states like New Jersey have recently implemented 
many smart corporate income tax reforms with 
favorable results.20 It would be odd that only those 
states that have still not made common-sense 
reforms should borrow. Fourth, states can always 
raise taxes later, and the politics of doing so might 
be different during a recovery.
In the end, however, it would be better for 
new borrowings to be paired with new revenue. 
One compromise would put in place tax increases 
that would only kick in as the economy expands 
or if revenues come in too far below what is 
needed.
What About Borrowing Limitation Rules?
Special debt rules have been part of American 
public finance for almost two centuries, and for a 
reason: It is tempting for current generations, 
especially politicians, to saddle the future with 
debt. States incurred huge debts in the 1830s 
building infrastructure (such as canals), and 
many of these projects ended up in the red when 
the economy turned. This experience of states 
facing default and near-default led to special 
constitutional rules as to incurring debt.21
However, to review that history and the 
associated rationales for borrowing limits is to 
understand why the current situation is different. 
The current generation is not trying to saddle the 
future with a speculative white elephant, but 16A recent CBPP report makes this point very persuasively. See 
Michael Mazerov and Elizabeth McNichol, “State Borrowing No 
Substitute for Additional Direct Aid to Help States Weather COVID 
Downturn,” CBPP (June 29, 2020).
17
See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,” 
supra note 2.
18
Nicole Nixon, “Newsom, California Lawmakers Agree to Budget 
Deal That Avoids Cuts to Health and Social Services,” CapRadio, June 
22, 2020.
19
See “How the Federal Reserve Should Help States and Localities 
Right Now,” supra note 2.
20
See “Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions,” 
supra note 2.
21
See Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo and John Joseph Wallis, “Fiscal 
Institutions and Fiscal Crises,” in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, 
When States Go Broke 23 (2012); Richard Briffault, “Foreword: The 
Disfavored Constitution,” 34 Rutgers L.J. 907, 947-49 (2003).
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rather must ensure that the future generation is 
given schooling and other services at least 
roughly comparable to what was being provided 
just a few months ago. States could hardly have 
socked away $500 billion in case of pandemic. 
And in fact, as we already noted, seared by the 
Great Recession, many states entered into this 
crisis with a reasonable level of budgetary 
reserves.22
So how can this sort of borrowing work? Can 
a stream of future tax revenue actually be sold in 
this way (that is, used to back borrowing in 
advance of when those future tax revenues are 
raised)? Yes, and indeed, there is a long history of 
financing new development projects through, in 
effect, selling the speculative increase in tax 
revenue that the development is expected to 
generate. This is called tax increment financing.23
And there are even more interesting models. 
For instance, states and localities sold their right 
to revenue from the giant settlement with the 
tobacco industry even though it was unclear how 
much revenue that settlement would bring.24 
Those bonds contained features to manage the 
uncertainty in the future revenues,25 and any 
issued coronavirus deficit bonds could do 
likewise.26
But Doesn’t State Constitutional Law Forbid 
General Deficit Spending?
Even if a good idea, we still must consider 
obstacles to states borrowing in these ways 
because of balanced budget rules in state 
constitutions. Our first response is that, in some 
states, either amending the constitution or 
putting a constitutionally authorized borrowing 
proposal on the ballot for voter approval is not 
that difficult. Each state should consider holding 
these votes or elections to authorize borrowing 
under its rules. The rationale is compelling and 
should carry the day in those votes or elections.
Of course, we appreciate that (for various 
reasons) holding votes or elections might not be 
appealing or possible in some states. But all is 
not necessarily lost. State rules prohibiting 
borrowing without an election have long been 
found by the courts to have important 
exceptions. We think our proposed borrowing 
can fit under several of these exceptions, 
although any state pursuing our approach 
would have to carefully consider its own specific 
case law. Here, we can only speak in broad 
strokes.
As to available exceptions, we will review 
two because we think the rationales for the legal 
rules track our policy arguments reasonably 
well. Some other exceptions might be available 
as well and could be justified on similar policy 
grounds.27
First, there is the cash flow borrowing 
exception. Here is a classic example: Property 
taxes are typically collected in one or two lump 
sums by local governments. Should a county be 
able to borrow at the nadir of its cash flow until 
it gets its second installment of property tax 
receipts? Courts in every state we know of say 
that it can.28 As we explained, the borrowing we 
are envisioning is also a cash flow borrowing, 
albeit over a longer cycle. Thus, so long as the 
overall structure is reasonable and does not put 
future taxpayers at any greater risk, we think the 
sort of borrowing we propose should also fit 
within this cash flow borrowing exception.
22
Auxier, supra note 8.
23
Briffault, “The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the 
Political Economy of Local Government,” 77(1) U. Chi. L. Rev. 65 (2010).
24
E. Matthew Quigley, “Securitizing Tobacco Settlements: The Basics, 
the Benefits, the Risks,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (2002).
25
See id.; see also Steve Hong, Allen Davis, and Stephanie Larosiliere, 
“Tobacco Bonds: An Unfiltered Look at a Unique Municipal Asset 
Class,” Invesco (Jan. 8, 2018), for a somewhat recent discussion of the 
market.
26
One important feature would be to permit a special redemption 
option if the federal government does step up. Other important features 
could include “turbo redemption” if revenues come in faster than 
expected or lengthening the term of the borrowing if revenues come in 
more slowly.
27
If a state court has upheld the “subject to appropriation” exception, 
then it would be straightforward for a legislature to use this exception, 
because all it requires is that the debt not be secured by a promise to 
repay. See Briffault, supra note 21.
There is also the different, more widespread contingent obligation 
exception, which requires that the borrowing occur in the form of a 
lease. Id. One issue with this exception is that it is unlikely to raise 
enough revenue because the state would raise revenue by selling 
property and then leasing it back. Note that Arizona used such a 
structure during the Great Recession. See Peter Carbonara, “Cash-
Hungry States Are Putting Buildings on the Block,” The New York Times, 
May 4, 2010.
28
See Robert S. Amdursky, Clayton P. Gillette, and G. Allen Bass, 
Municipal Debt Financing Law section 4.4 (2013). During the Great 
Depression, the California Supreme Court even upheld issuing claims on 
future revenue that were not likely to be repaid until after the then-
current two-year budget period. Riley v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 2d 529 (1936).
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Second, there is the special fund exception.29 
Under this exception, if all that investors are 
promised is a specific revenue stream — and no 
more — then those borrowings are not considered 
to trigger the election requirement or other state 
constitutional bars against deficit spending 
because the government’s general taxing power is 
not being promised. This exception is common, 
but state courts also have varied on whether they 
interpret it broadly or narrowly. The narrow 
version of the exception potentially requires that 
the borrowing be secured only by funds that 
would not have existed if not for the borrowing — 
say, by using only toll revenues to pay for a 
bridge.30 The broader version of the exception 
focuses on the separateness of the revenue stream 
rather than the nexus with the project. Generally, 
prominent commentators have considered the 
narrow interpretation of the exception more 
favorably than have the courts.31
Though we would not endorse the broader 
view in every case, we think the narrow view is 
unduly restrictive. To go back to the beginning, 
the classic debt problems that ended in trouble in 
the 1830s involved states backing up the debt of 
private entities — such as a railroad — with the 
taxing power of the state. If the project succeeded, 
disproportionate benefits would flow to some 
interest groups. Failure, however, would be borne 
by all.
This blending of public and private was why 
the debt limitation rules were typically 
accompanied by constitutional provisions 
regarding public purpose, gift of public funds, 
subscription of stock, etc.32 This is also why 
circumventing debt limitations through 
privatization is problematic in ways that resonate 
with the historical problem these provisions were 
to solve.33
A revenue bond using securitized general tax 
revenue — even new tax revenue, which is what 
we propose as ideal — is also a burden on 
taxpayers, but it is a cabined liability in time and 
amount. Importantly, our proposals would not 
involve taxpayers taking on unknown risks, much 
less unknown risks based on speculative projects 
particularly likely to benefit a powerful few. 
Indeed, to the extent that the taxpayers get money 
now, while bondholders have to wait to see how 
much revenue that tax increases yield, taxpayers 
have shifted risk from themselves to the investors, 
effectively the opposite of the classic problematic 
financings of the 19th century.34
It is true that the financings we propose could 
balkanize the general tax base, and there are good 
reasons to be concerned with this practice. But 
this was not the primary target of the debt 
limitation provisions, and we think courts should 
be wary of constitutionalizing this concern. This is 
because there is also an argument that earmarking 
taxes does not destroy a tax base, but preserves it 
because voters or interest groups will protect a tax 
with clear benefits or beneficiaries.35 We are not 
taking sides on the earmarking debate; our 
primary concern is to argue that courts should 
also not take sides absent a clear mandate. To fully 
fit within our argument and the law in some 
jurisdictions, it might be necessary for states to 
securitize new revenue in this way.
Do State Constitutional Limits Even Apply 
In an ‘Emergency’?
Beyond our earlier discussions, some state 
debt limitation rules apply “except in case of 
war to repel invasion or suppress 
insurrection.”36 Those exceptions support the 
legal case for borrowing under any exception. 
At the broadest level, the emergency exception 29Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass, supra note 28, at section 4.5; Briffault, 
supra note 21, at 917-19.
30
See Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass, supra note 28, at section 4.6; see, 
e.g.,City of Trinidad v. Haxby, 315 P.2d 204 (1957).
31
To be clear, prominent commentators seem more skeptical of a 
broad reading, while courts seem split or even tend to the broader 
analysis. See, e.g., Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass, supra note 28, at sections 
4.5-6 (collecting cases, expressing doubt about broader interpretation of 
exception); Briffault, supra note 21, at 919 (collecting cases and 
concluding that: “The cases are not always consistent, but the trend has 
been to loosen the nexus required between the project financed by the 
bond and the revenues committed to paying off the obligation in order 
to justify avoidance of the debt limitations”).
32
See Briffault supra note 21.
33
Julie Roin, “Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues,” 85 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1965 (2011).
34
Amdursky, Gillette, and Bass see the issue of who bears the risk as 
central to the question whether a debt is constrained by the debt 
limitation rules. Supra note 28, at section 4.1.
35
Susannah Camic Tahk, “Public Choice Theory & Earmarked 
Taxes,” 68 Tax L. Rev. 755 (2015).
36
See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. XVI, section 1. See also Amdursky, Gillette, 
and Bass, supra note 28, at section 4.4.
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indicates an understanding that borrowing in 
response to an emergency is not subject to the 
same political process concerns as the 
speculative financings of the 19th century. Thus, 
a state court that has an exception of this kind in 
its borrowing limitation has a textual warrant 
for the proposition that debt limitation rules 
were not meant to prevent borrowing in case of 
emergency. This could be a useful complement 
to using some other exception.
In at least one state, there is no need to use 
the emergency language as a complement. In 
New Jersey, this debt limitation provision grants 
an exception for “acts of god,” and so borrowing 
in response to the pandemic would seem to be 
plainly permitted.37 Appropriately, the New 
Jersey Legislature approved an almost $10 
billion borrowing authorization. The statute was 
challenged, but the New Jersey Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld the law.38
In states with the narrower insurrection/
invasion-type language, we think that the 
legislature could still argue that no other 
exception is needed by appealing to the canon of 
ejusdem generis — these are the types of 
emergencies that suspend the usual rule — 
rather than that of expressio unius, which would 
limit the emergencies to the ones named in the 
constitution. And this makes sense: Why would 
the authors of the state constitution except 
emergency spending to treat the victims of a 
war, but not a pandemic?
At least a few state courts have interpreted 
their provisions broadly in roughly this manner. 
For example, the Washington Supreme Court 
upheld a bond issue for unemployment relief in 
the midst of the Great Depression.39 The court 
reasoned that mass unemployment had caused 
signs of insurrection, and that the Legislature’s 
determination that an “incipient” insurrection 
existed was conclusive “unless, giving effect to 
every presumption in its favor, the court can say 
that such legislative declaration, on its face, is 
obviously false and a palpable attempt at 
dissimulation.”40 The California Supreme Court 
found the issue whether an insurrection existed 
to be a political question and permitted 
borrowing in connection with bonuses to Civil 
War soldiers41 and the financing of a railroad.42 
Note that the California bonus provision was 
made during the Civil War. Several state 
supreme courts upheld borrowing for bonus 
provisions for soldiers made after World War I.43
If a state does plan to use any of these 
exceptions, then it would be prudent to also create 
a fast-tracked procedure so that the courts can 
hear any possible legal objections quickly.
Conclusion
To go back to the beginning, we reemphasize 
that what we are proposing here is inferior to the 
federal government stepping in to do its job 
adequately.44 However, especially if the only 
other feasible choice is savage cuts to needed 
spending programs, we consider borrowing of 
the sort that we have proposed to be the far 
superior option. 
37
N.J. Const. Art. VIII, section 2.
38
Samantha Marcus, “Murphy Can Borrow Up to $9.9B During 
Pandemic, N.J. Supreme Court Rules,” NJ.com, Aug. 12, 2020.
39
State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 23 Pac.(2d) 1 (Wash. 1933).
40
See id. at 4.
41
Franklin v. State Board of Examiners, 23 Cal. 273 (1863).
42
People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175 (1865).
43
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 113 Kan. 4, 213 P. 171 (1923).
44
Note that this is the second crisis of the 21st century in which the 
federal government has failed in this way; thus, the question whether 
states should have more formal backup plans is one we plan to revisit.
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